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On 15 April 2021, AG Pikamäe delivered his opinion in the IS case, originating
from a Hungarian criminal proceeding against a Swedish national. The national
judge referred three questions for preliminary reference to the CJEU, one regarding
the suspect’s right to translation and two regarding the general status of judicial
independence in Hungary. As a reaction, the Hungarian Prosecutor General initiated
a so-called “appeal in the interests of the law” and the Hungarian Supreme Court
held the reference to be unlawful. As a direct consequence of the declaration of
illegality, disciplinary proceedings were started against the judge. These latter
procedures were addressed in additional questions to the CJEU.
In his opinion, AG Pikamäe argued that the initial questions to the CJEU regarding
judicial independence were irrelevant for the case, but the additional questions
raised could be admissible. He underlined the importance of a free dialogue
between independent national courts for EU law. But the opinion also shows that the
preliminary ruling mechanism cannot remedy the Commission’s inaction to address
systemic problems through its rule of law tools, such as Article 7 TEU or infringement
procedures.
The preliminary reference
The case C#564/19 criminal proceedings against IS originates from a Hungarian
criminal proceeding of a Swedish national, suspended by Judge Vasvári of the Pest
Central District Court. The suspect was charged for bringing weapons he lawfully
held in his home country without the requisite permission to the territory of Hungary.
The case was extensively discussed by Hungarian colleagues on this blog. (See
analyses by Dániel G. Szabó, and Judge Vadász.) The procedure was suspended
and the national court referred three questions to the CJEU in line with Article
267 TFEU. First, Judge Vasvári asked whether the accused was denied the use
of his first language during the proceedings, in violation of Directive 2010/64/EU,
considering that there is neither a register of independent interpreters and translators
in Hungary, nor an effective quality system for translators and interpreters.
Second, the judge asked whether certain elements of what he considers to be a
judicial capture were corresponding to the rule of law and judicial independence
as guaranteed by the Treaties. Third, the court asked whether the judges’ low
remuneration was in line with the concept of judicial independence as understood in
EU law.
As reported earlier, after the reference had been submitted to Luxembourg, the
Hungarian Prosecutor General initiated a so-called “appeal in the interests of the
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law” against the decision incorporating the preliminary reference in front of the Kúria
(the Hungarian Supreme Court). He argued that all questions were irrelevant for the
case at hand, but the second and third questions were particularly problematic, since
they did not influence the outcome of the criminal procedure and were not even
about the interpretation of EU law. The Kúria agreed with the Prosecutor General
without reservations and held the reference to be unlawful, without attaching any
further legal consequences to this finding. (This was the maximum the Kúria could
do in line with Article 669(3) of the Code of Criminal procedure as in such cases the
decision is declaratory in nature.) The Kúria’s decision straightforwardly restricted
lower courts’ right (and sometimes even obligation) to turn to the CJEU, since –
so the judgment goes – the harmony between Hungarian and EU law must not be
subject to preliminary references. And due to the hierarchy of courts, every single
ordinary judge in Hungary must respect the Kúria’s decision.
But there is more: The Acting President of the Metropolitan Court, expressly because
the reference for a preliminary ruling had been rendered unlawful by the Kúria,
initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the referring judge.
In light of the above circumstances two more questions were added to the
preliminary request by the referring court: whether it was in line with EU law to
declare a preliminary reference unlawful, and whether it was permissible to start
disciplinary proceedings against a judge for filing preliminary references.
The AG Opinion
On 15 April 2021 AG Pikamäe delivered his opinion in IS. The AG recalled that
questions referred for preliminary rulings can only be admitted if they are necessary
to be answered by the CJEU in order for the referring court to pass a judgment
in the case before it. The first question on the right to interpretation is deemed to
be relevant by the AG and therefore admissible. (paras 53-84) But in the AG’s
view, the second and the third questions relating to the overall health status of the
Hungarian judiciary are not suited for preliminary ruling procedures, since they are
irrelevant for the national procedure, and are therefore inadmissible. (paras 85-92)
The fourth and fifth questions in turn are related to domestic attempts to destroy the
system of preliminary references and usurp the powers of the CJEU to determine
which preliminary questions are relevant and admissible, and which are not. The
AG suggests making question four on the declaration of illegality admissible, while
regarding question five on disciplinary proceedings, he offers alternative paths for
the CJEU.
Declaring a preliminary reference illegal
The AG underlines the importance of a free dialogue between independent national
courts and the CJEU for the preliminary ruling procedures to function. Initiating such
a procedure depends exclusively on the court before which a case is pending, and
it is up to the CJEU alone to determine whether answering the referred questions
is indeed needed for the original dispute. (paras 44-47) Ultimately the questions
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may be irrelevant and thus inadmissible, but the CJEU insists to retain the right to
determine this. Once the CJEU delivers a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of
EU law, the referring national court is required to follow that ruling. The declaration
of illegality, published in the Hungarian compendium of judgments of principle, might
hinder national judges from fulfilling this obligation. (para 49) Answering the fourth
question, therefore, the AG believes that – in line with the principle of the primacy
of EU law –, Judge Vasvári must set aside the illegality decision and disapply the
national legislation, which led the Kúria to hold that his reference was unlawful.
(paras 50-52)
Disciplinary procedures against judges
With regard to the assessment of disciplinary proceedings for filing preliminary
references, the case closest to IS is probably Miasto #owicz and Prokurator
Generalny, duly referenced by the AG Opinion. In Miasto #owicz the state was a
party, and the judges feared to be subjected to disciplinary proceedings if they were
to decide against the state. So they asked the CJEU to assess Polish law in light
of EU norms including previous CJEU case-law on judicial independence. As if to
prove the judges’ point, they were summoned to attend a hearing concerning the
reasons for turning to the CJEU, when filing their preliminary references. The CJEU
however declared the requests inadmissible, for the lack of necessity in light of the
original dispute. Furthermore, the CJEU noted that the proceedings have since been
closed on the ground that no disciplinary misconduct was proven. (For criticism of
the CJEU’s stance see Professor Platon and Professor Pech et al.)
The AG takes this case-law into account when it holds that the disciplinary
proceeding bears no relation to the actual facts of the main criminal procedure.
(paras 96-97) But the AG acknowledges the “particularly worrying and regrettable
circumstances” (para 93) and offers a way to the CJEU to declare the fifth question
admissible. He believes that the supplementary request, i.e. questions four and
five could be regarded as an indivisible, indissociable whole. Once the questions
are admitted, the CJEU could rely on its obiter dictum in Miasto #owicz. (paras
98-100) In that case the CJEU stated that national law provisions exposing judges
to disciplinary proceedings for having submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling
cannot be permitted, since the mere prospect of such a proceeding is likely to
undermine the effective exercise of Article 267 TFEU. (Miasto #owicz, paras 55-59)
A brief assessment of the AG Opinion
The AG Opinion could have dismissed all judicial independence related questions
(questions two and three) – had the Kúria not declared the reference unlawful
and had the Acting President of the Metropolitan Court not initiated disciplinary
proceedings. But the reference, especially its question two, was regarded as a
criticism of the judicial “reform” and thus could not be left unanswered. Ironically, or
perhaps naturally, the disciplinary proceeding was triggered by someone appointed
in a dubious procedure, which was one of the issues discussed in the reference.
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PM Orbán, during the debate of the Sargentini report that culminated in triggering
an Article 7(1) TEU procedure by the European Parliament against the Hungarian
government, famously said that ‘We would never sink so low as to silence those
with whom we disagree.’ In reality however, one of the main characteristics of the
Fidesz government since 2010 is eliminating all forms of checks on the government
and any type of dissent. This happens via violations of separation of powers,
checks and balances, constitutional scrutiny, judicial oversight, media pluralism,
journalistic freedom, shrinking the space for civil society, institutional and personal
attacks against academia – all well documented on this blog. The criticism on courts
packaged in the preliminary reference by Judge Vasvári was not to be tolerated
either.
And it is this overreaction by the Kúria and the Metropolitan Court that saves the
case from the viewpoint of judicial independence. Because judicial independence
has a special role in the EU legal system. It is not only important from the individual’s
perspective, but it is also crucial for EU law, since – as CJEU President Lenaerts put
it – it is domestic courts together with the CJEU, i.e. ‘the European Community of
judges’, which ensure that the EU and national authorities respect the ‘rules of the
game’ in a community based on the rule of law. This concern about a functioning
judicial dialogue makes the CJEU react forcefully when national authorities violate
judicial independence by attacking the system of preliminary references. (See cases
Atanas Ognyanov and RH)
The CJEU is likely to agree that the second and the third questions are irrelevant
for the decision of the criminal law case. And indeed, systemic problems should
be tackled in different procedures by different actors, such as Article 7 TEU
procedures, rule of law conditionality, or infringement actions conducted by political
EU institutions. During the hearing, the representative of the Commission’s legal
service, who argued for inadmissibility added that ‘[t]he Commission continues to
monitor the independence of the Hungarian courts and raised concerns regarding
the powers and functioning of the National Judicial Office’. This was a sadly ironic
statement, since the preliminary reference in IS was filed exactly because of the
inaction of the various institutions, and especially the Commission, that instead of
guarding the Treaties and imposing dissuasive sanctions on rule of law violators,
engaged in more and more monitoring, benchmarking, discussion and dialogues
leading nowhere, normalising rule of law backsliding and leaving sufficient time to
illiberal governments to complete constitutional capture.
The CJEU can of course not remedy the Commission’s inaction and its failure to
start infringement and other procedures. But it can admit both questions four and
five in the present case, and acknowledge that disciplinary proceedings come
close to SLAPP suits (strategic litigation against participation) – that the EU plans
to fight forcefully –, in the sense that they are meritless and vexatious lawsuits
against someone formulating a position uncomfortable to a powerful party, in this
case the government. The outcome of the case is less important, the procedure’s
main aim is to intimidate the defendant, and to discourage him or her and others
in similar shoes from expressing critical views. One could expect a rule of law
friendly judgment to follow a precautionary approach and dismiss national measures
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including disciplinary proceedings that are likely to have a chilling effect on the use of
Article 267 TFEU proceedings or any EU law principle or value, as being contrary to
EU law.
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